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Dear Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Associate Justices:
The ACLU of San Diego & Imperial Counties, the ACLU of Southern California,
the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Northern California, the Asian
Pacific American Legal Center, a member of the Asian American Center for Advancing
Justice, the Association of Alternative Newsweeklies, the Association of Southern
California Defense Counsel, the California Anti-SLAPP Project, the California
Broadcasters Association, the California Newspaper Publishers Association, the Center
for Judicial Excellence, the Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles,
Dow Jones & Company, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Environmental Law
Foundation, the First Amendment Coalition, the First Amendment Project, the Golden
State Manufactured-Home Owners League, the Magazine Publishers of America, the
Planning and Conservation League, and Public Counsel (collectively, the Coalition)
respectfully urge this court to order the Court of Appeal's opinion in Grewal v. Jammu
(2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 977 (Grewal) not to be published in the official reports.
Although Grewal is a straightforward appeal that implicated no important
issues and involved no novel facts, the Court of Appeal published extensive dicta
criticizing the anti-SLAPP statute's broad scope and its immediate right of appeal
provision—points that were not addressed by the parties' briefs, were unnecessary to
the resolution of the case before it, and which relied on erroneous examples of supposed
abuse and misleading statistics to attack the anti-SLAPP statute. This is the rare case
where depublication is necessary because Grewal's dicta will escape review since no
petition for review has been filed and the issues necessary to the resolution of the case
are not worthy of review.
In particular, Grewal's dicta: (1) selectively cited cases in an effort to show that
some defendants have supposedly filed abusive anti-SLAPP motions challenging claims
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that, in Grewal's view, were not covered by the anti-SLAPP statute (Grewal, .supra, 191
Cal.App.4th at pp. 999-1000) while ignoring contrary case authority concluding that
the statute applies to such claims; and (2) relied on statistics that, in Grewal's view,
show that the anti-SLAPP statute is being abused (id. at pp. 998-999) while ignoring
the complete statistical record that shows no such abuse is occurring. The court then
used this misleading "evidence" of abuse to attack a defendant's statutory right to
immediately appeal anti-SLAPP orders and asserted that there is no helpful legislative
history supporting this right (id. at pp. 998, 1000-1003) while seeking to minimize the
significant legislative history favoring a defendant's right to appeal and the balance
struck by the Legislature between vindicating defendants' rights under the statute
through appeal and the delay plaintiffs face during that process.
Absent depublication, Grewal's erroneous dicta will remain published, fostering
confusion among litigants and courts as well as threatening to deter parties from filing
proper anti-SLAPP motions and appeals that are necessary to protect their
fundamental constitutional rights to free speech and petition from SLAPP suits.

The interests of the Coalition
The Coalition consists of public interest organizations, trade associations, and
businesses who have widely disparate goals and interests but who all share at least one
key common interest: protecting the constitutional rights to free speech and petition.
The rights to free speech and to petition for redress of grievances are
fundamental rights protected by the First Amendment and the California Constitution.
(Smith v. Silvey (1983) 149 Cal.App .3d 400, 406.) Indeed, each of these ranks amongst
the "most precious" of constitutional rights. (Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn. (1967)
389 U.S. 217, 222; San Francisco Forty-Niners v. Nishioka (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 637,
647.)
The anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, is "vital
legislation" (Paul for Council v. Hanyecz (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1366, disapproved
on another ground by Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th
53, 68, fn. 5)—a statute " ' "designed to protect citizens in the exercise of their First
Amendment constitutional rights of free speech and petition" ' " (Bernardo v. Planned
Parenthood Federation of America (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 322, 340). " "[T]he common
feature of SLAPP suits are their lack of merit and chilling of defendants' valid exercise
of free speech and the right to petition," ' " and section 425.16 " "was intended to
address those features by providing a fast and inexpensive unmasking and dismissal of
SLAPP's." ' " (Ibid.) Simply put, the Legislature enacted the anti-SLAPP statute
because it believed this legislation was "needed" to "protect the public from lawsuits
brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of First Amendment rights."
(Fox
Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 294, 307.)

Honorable Tani Cantil-Sakauye, Chief Justice
and Associate Justices
March 9, 2011
Page 3

Why depublication is necessary
A.

Depublication is necessary because Grewal's dicta creates severe
conflicts with the decisions of this court and the Courts of Appeal as
well as the statute's plain language, and threatens to chill the filing of
proper anti-SLAPP motions.

Grewal states in dicta that "actions against attorneys," "personal injury claims,"
and "insurance coverage cases" are all "cases that involve complaints that simply do
not 'arise from' protected activity" covered by the anti-SLAPP statute yet in the Grewal
court's view improperly "generate anti-SLAPP motions nevertheless." (Grewal, supra,
191 Cal.App.4th at p. 999.) Additionally, Grewal indicates that if one defendant in a
case files an anti-SLAPP motion at one stage and a different defendant later files a
different anti-SLAPP motion challenging the same claims, that "alone would be an
abuse" of the anti-SLAPP statute. (Id. at pp. 982, 999-1000.) Grewal's view that these
two broad examples constitute abusive anti-SLAPP litigation is wrong and directly
conflicts with the decisions of this court and the Courts of Appeal as well as the antiSLAPP statute's plain language.

First, this court, the Courts of Appeal, or both have held that the anti-SLAPP
statute does apply to claims against attorneys (including claims for malicious
prosecution, abuse of process, and malpractice), personal injury claims, and claims
involving insurers. (E.g., Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Ca1.4th 728,
732-741 [anti-SLAPP statute applied to malicious prosecution action against attorney];
Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Ca1.4th 1106, 1109, 11141115 [anti-SLAPP statute applied to claims for intentional and negligent infliction of
emotional distress]; 1 State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Lee (Jan. 31, 2011,
C062380) Cal.App.4th [2011 D.A.R. 3170, 3171-3172] [applying anti-SLAPP
statute to cross-claims against insurer for abuse of process and unfair business
practices] Mallard v. Progressive Choice Ins. Co. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 531, 534-542
[anti-SLAPP statute applied to abuse of process claim against attorney]; Seltzer v.
Barnes (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 953, 958-969 [anti-SLAPP statute applied to claim
against attorney for intentional infliction of emotional distress]; Premier Medical
Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th
464, 468-477 [anti-SLAPP statute applied to claims against insurers]; Peregrine
Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 658,
668-675 (Peregrine) [anti-SLAPP statute applied to claims against attorneys for
Claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress are personal
injury claims. (See, e.g., San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 13
Ca1.4th 893, 912; Bennett v. Suncloud (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 91, 97.)
1
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professional malpractice and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty]; Dickens v.
Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 705, 707-717 [anti-SLAPP
statute applied to malicious prosecution claims against insurer].)
While other California appellate courts have either disagreed that the statute
applies to some of these types of claims or identified instances where the statute might
not apply to such claims in a specific case if they do not arise from acts in furtherance
of the constitutional rights to free speech or petition (see Grewal, supra, 191
Cal.App.4th at p. 999 [collecting cases]), that does not mean the statute never applies to
claims against attorneys, personal injury claims, or claims involving insurers. This
case law simply reflects that California's appellate courts have determined that the
anti-SLAPP statute applies to such claims in some instances but not in others
depending on the specific bases for particular claims and that courts are split over
whether the statute applies to certain types of claims, like those for malpractice.
(Compare, e.g., Peregrine, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at pp. 668-675 [anti-SLAPP statute
applied to claims against attorneys for professional malpractice] with PrediWave Corp.
v. Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1204, 1224-1228
[disagreeing with Peregrine and holding anti-SLAPP statute did not apply to
malpractice claims].)
Grewal ignores these significant nuances and instead broadly and erroneously
suggests the anti-SLAPP statute never applies to claims against attorneys, personal
injury claims, or claims involving insurers. By doing so, Grewal directly conflicts with
the decisions of this court and the lower appellate courts.

Second, the fact one defendant files an earlier unsuccessful anti-SLAPP motion
challenging certain claims does not bar another defendant from later filing a proper
anti-SLAPP motion challenging those claims. The contrary view expressed in Grewal
conflicts with the plain language of the anti-SLAPP statute, which provides that if a
court "determines that the plaintiff has established a probability that he or she will
prevail on the claim, neither that determination nor the fact of that determination
shall be admissible in evidence at any later stage of the case, or in any subsequent
action, and no burden of proof or degree of proof otherwise applicable shall be affected
by that determination in any later stage of the case or in any subsequent proceeding."
(Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(3).) This provision—which Grewal ignores and
which must be construed broadly (see Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (a))—bars a court
from using its finding against one defendant under prong two of the anti-SLAPP
statute as a basis for denying a different defendant's separate anti-SLAPP motion.
Moreover, Grewal's contrary view makes no sense. When a plaintiff opposes
anti-SLAPP motions brought by different defendants in the same lawsuit, the plaintiff
may have sufficient admissible evidence to show he has a probability of prevailing
against one defendant but may not have sufficient evidence to show a probability of
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prevailing against the other defendants. (E.g., Scalzo v. Baker (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th
91, 94-96, 99-102 (Scalzo) [reversing order granting certain defendants' anti-SLAPP
motion because plaintiffs had shown probability of prevailing against them but
affirming order granting separate anti-SLAPP motion filed by other defendants
(including attorney defendants who plaintiffs had sued) because plaintiffs had not
shown a probability of prevailing against them].) If Grewal's erroneous view of
supposedly abusive anti-SLAPP litigation were the law, Grewal could not only be in
conflict with cases like Scalzo but would also promote an improper race between each
co-defendant to the courthouse to have each co-defendant's anti-SLAPP motion decided
first to avoid having an anti-SLAPP motion conclusively predetermined as a matter of
law by another defendant's earlier and unsuccessful anti-SLAPP motion.
In sum, depublication of Grewal is necessary because, by identifying the
foregoing erroneous examples of abusive anti-SLAPP motions, Grewal is likely to foster
confusion as to whether such motions may be filed in actions against attorneys,
personal injury actions, actions involving insurers, or in cases where another defendant
has previously filed an unsuccessful anti-SLAPP motion.
Depublication of Grewal is also necessary because, even assuming Grewal's
examples of abusive anti-SLAPP litigation were correct (they are not), Grewal's
overbroad definition of what constitutes an abusive anti-SLAPP motion nonetheless
threatens to deter defendants from properly invoking the crucial protections of the
anti-SLAPP statue to protect their vital constitutional rights from SLAPP suits.
In particular, Grewal suggests anti-SLAPP motions are abusive if they are filed
in actions against attorneys, personal injury actions, or actions involving insurers
based on prior appellate decisions in which other appellate courts had concluded the
anti-SLAPP statute did not apply to particular claims. (See Grewal, supra, 191
Cal.App.4th at p. 999.) Plaintiffs and courts may thus construe Grewal as broadly
defining an abusive anti-SLAPP motion as any motion challenging a claim where an
appellate court had previously concluded the statute did not apply to a similar claim.
Under this broad standard, a defendant who knows that at least one Court of
Appeal has held the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to a particular claim might be
accused of abusing the statute if he nonetheless files an anti-SLAPP motion
challenging a similar claim. There is a real danger such a defendant would decline to
bring an anti-SLAPP motion under those circumstances, especially to avoid the threat
of having fees awarded against him under the anti-SLAPP statute (see Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 425.16, subd. (c)(1))—and thereby be deterred from legitimately taking advantage of
vital anti-SLAPP legislation designed to protect the defendant's constitutional rights.
The right to invoke the critical protection of the anti-SLAPP statute against lawsuits
brought to chill the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights should not be
conditioned on whether one Court of Appeal has previously held the statute does not
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apply to a claim in a specific case or whether a co-defendant has previously brought an
unsuccessful anti-SLAPP motion. Otherwise, the anti-SLAPP statute's crucial
safeguards that are designed to protect the rights to free speech and petition could be
diluted or even rendered a nullity.
B.

Depublication is necessary because Grewal's dicta relies on misleading
and incomplete statistics.

Grewal also relies on the number of pages in the portion of the annotated code
setting out the anti-SLAPP statute to suggest that the statute has been sorely abused.
(See Grewal, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 998.) This view regarding the supposed
" explosion" of allegedly abusive anti-SLAPP motions lead the court to call on the
Legislature to repeal a defendant's right to immediately appeal from the denial of an
anti-SLAPP motion because these appeals themselves abusively add to plaintiffs' delay.
(See id. at pp. 998, 1000-1003.) But the actual facts regarding the number of written
opinions show that no abuse is occurring—and that Grewal's finding of abusive antiSLAPP litigation and its call for a repeal of the defendant's right of appeal are thus
without merit.
In 2010, the California intermediate appellate courts and this court decided 102
appeals (including both published and unpublished opinions) from orders granting or
denying anti-SLAPP motions. 2 In 2009, 107 such appeals were decided. In
comparison, the most recent Judicial Council statistics show that in the 2008-2009
fiscal year, the Courts of Appeal disposed of 11,477 appeals by written opinion. (See
Judicial Council of Cal., Admin. Off. of Cts., Rep. on Court Statistics (2010) Courts of
Appeal Table 5, p. 25 (hereafter 2010 Court Statistics Report).) 3 Thus, anti-SLAPP
opinions by the appellate courts constitute roughly .9 percent of the total appellate
opinions issued by California courts in recent years. Hardly a crisis.
More fundamentally, the actual dispositions of anti-SLAPP appeals do not show
any abuse. The majority of anti-SLAPP appeals (59 in 2009 and 53 in 2010) occurred
in appeals from orders granting anti-SLAPP motions—appeals that would likely have
Unless otherwise noted, the information for the statistics set forth in this section
were gathered by searching the Westlaw database of California published and
unpublished opinions for the terms "anti-slapp /10 motion /p appeal." At the court's
request, we will provide a chart showing by name each opinion and its disposition. We
were informed by the Clerk's office that our depublication request would not be filed if
we appended such an extensive chart to our letter.
2

This report is at available at the California Courts website. (Court Statistics Report
<http://www.courts.ca.gov/13421.htm > [as of March 9, 2011].)
3
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been taken as appeals from a final judgment irrespective of whether the anti-SLAPP
statute gave any party a right to appeal. Furthermore, in the appeals from orders
denying anti-SLAPP motions (49 in 2010 and 48 in 2009), the appellate courts reversed
22 of these orders, for a 22.6 percent reversal rate. This reversal rate is far greater
than the general appellate reversal rate of 10 percent and also higher than the reversal
rates in all civil cases of 19 percent. (See 2010 Court Statistics Report, supra, Courts of
Appeal Table 6, p. 26.) Thus, far from confirming that defendants are filing meritless
anti-SLAPP motions and appeals, these statistics confirm that defendants often require
the immediate right of appeal to vindicate their right to early termination of a
meritless SLAPP suit.
Grewal further relies on Judicial Council statistics that show the number of trial
court anti-SLAPP filings per year as supposed support for its claim that the antiSLAPP statute is being misused. (See Grewal, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at pp. 998-999.)
However, the total number of motions filed per year is a misleading measure of
whether the statute has been abused. According to the same Judicial Council
spreadsheet that Grewal relied on for its statistics, parties filed a total of 2,881 antiSLAPP motions in trial courts throughout California between 2005 and 2010, or
roughly 481 motions per year. 4 During that six-year period, an appeal was filed in
only 375 of those cases—i.e., roughly 13 percent of the time (or roughly 62 anti-SLAPP
appeals on average per year). Put another way, in nearly ninety percent of cases, no
anti-SLAPP appeal was filed. Moreover, given the 6,199,276 total civil filings in the
superior courts between the fiscal years of 2005 and 2009 (the latest date for which we
have data), these 2,881 anti-SLAPP motions constitute only about .046 percent of total
civil filings. (See 2010 Court Statistics Report, supra, Superior Courts Table 4, p. 47.)
Thus, the evidence Grewal relies on confirms that there has been no abusive explosion
of anti-SLAPP litigation. Again, no crisis here.

In short, there is no evidence that anti-SLAPP motions are overwhelming
California courts or that there has been an abusive explosion of such motions or
appeals. In fact, the Legislature accurately predicted the negligible effect the antiSLAPP statute's right of appeal would have on appellate courts. The Department of
Finance's enrolled bill report for Assembly Bill (AB) 1675 (the statute providing an
immediate right of appeal for the granting or denial of anti-SLAPP motions) (1)
concluded that under then-existing law (i.e., before defendants had an immediate right
to appeal anti-SLAPP orders), appellate courts reviewed approximately 30 SLAPP
motions each year and (2) noted that "the Judicial Council estimate [d] that the SLAPP
At the court's request, we will submit a copy of the extensive spreadsheet from the
Judicial Council and show how we secured the information cited in our letter.
4
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appeals authorized in AB 1675 would result in an increase of approximately 90
additional cases per year." (Dept. of Finance Enrolled Bill Report AB 1675 (Sept. 16,
1999).) In 2009 and 2010, the Courts of Appeal decided fewer than the 120 anti-SLAPP
appeals per year that the Legislature expected would result from AB 1675's revision of
the anti-SLAPP statute to include an immediate right of appeal.
Depublication is warranted to strike Grewal's misleading statistics from the
published reports to avoid confusion among courts and litigants as to whether a
defendant has filed an abusive anti-SLAPP motion or appeal. As we next explain, the
Court of Appeal's erroneous "evidence" of abuse of the statute should not be used as a
court-sanctioned lobbying effort to convince the Legislature to eliminate the immediate
right of appeal that it specifically added to the anti-SLAPP statute.
C.

Depublication is warranted because Grewal's attempt to lobby for a
statutory amendment based on misleading data and an erroneous view
of legislative history should not remain in the published reports.

Prior to 1999, orders granting anti-SLAPP motions could be "appealed directly
under most circumstances" but orders denying such motions could "only be reviewed by
a writ until the proceedings in the trial court" were complete. (Braun, Increasing
SLAPP Protection: Unburdening the Right of Petition in California (1999) 32 U.C.
Davis L.Rev. 965, 1008 (hereafter Braun).) In 1998, at the request of the Judicial
Council, SLAPP scholars George Pring and Penelope Canan prepared a report that
recommended seven improvements to the original anti-SLAPP statute, including
statutory authorization for an immediate right of appeal from orders denying antiSLAPP motions. (Braun, California's Anti-SLAPP Remedy After Eleven Years (2003)
34 McGeorge L.Rev. 731, 778-779 & fn. 280.) The Judicial Council reported those
recommendations to the Legislature in 1999 but the Council's report rejected all seven
recommendations. (Ibid.) In rejecting the proposal for an immediate right of appeal,
the Judicial Council insisted no such right was necessary because review by writ
petition was "sufficient." (Braun, supra, at p. 1011 & fn. 182.) The Legislature,
however, chose to override the Judicial Council's recommendation against an
immediate right of appeal by enacting AB 1675 that same year, which amended the
anti-SLAPP statute to expressly provide that "[a]n order granting or denying a special
motion to strike shall be appealable." (Stats. 1999, ch. 960, § 1, p. 5486.)
Indeed, AB 1675's legislative history makes plain that the Legislature viewed a
defendant's right to an immediate appeal as a vitally necessary component of the antiSLAPP statute. As a report prepared by the Assembly Committee on Judiciary
explained, the "key issue" addressed by AB 1675 was whether "a defendant subject to a
`S.L.A.P.P. Suit' [should] be permitted to immediately appeal the denial of a special
motion to strike the law suit?" (Assem. Com . on Judiciary, Assem. Bill No. 1675 (19992000 Reg. Sess.) as introduced March 16, 1999, p. 1.) This report states that AB 1675
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"furthers the purpose of the Anti-SLAPP Law . . . by allowing the defendant to
immediately appeal a denial of a special motion to strike. Without this ability, a
defendant will have to incur the cost of a lawsuit before having his or her right to free
speech vindicated. When a meritorious anti-SLAPP motion is denied, the defendant,
under current law, has only two options. The first is to file a writ of appeal, which is
discretionary and rarely granted. The second is to defend the lawsuit. If the defendant
wins, the Anti-SLAPP Law is useless and has failed to protect the defendant's
constitutional rights." (Id. at p. 2; see also Sen. Com . on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem.
Bill No. 1675 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 28, 1999, p. 3 [recognizing key
point of AB 1675 was to create right of appeal].)
In short, AB 1675's legislative history clearly confirms that the Legislature gave
defendants statutory authorization to immediately appeal orders denying anti-SLAPP
motions because this right to an appeal was essential to protecting defendants from
SLAPP suits. (See Varian, Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Ca1.4th 180, 193
(Varian) [holding that AB 1675's legislative history confirms that Legislature amended
anti-SLAPP statute to add an immediate right of appeal because, absent the ability to
appeal, defendants would have to incur costs of a lawsuit to vindicate their
constitutional rights]; Doe v. Luster (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 139, 144-145 [observing
that "[t]he Legislature concluded it was necessary to authorize an immediate appeal"
and setting forth legislative history explaining why the right of appeal is critical to
further the purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute].)
Using the erroneous evidence of abuse described above, and, notwithstanding
the Legislature's rejection of the Judicial Council's resistance to an immediate right of
appeal, its decision to amend the anti- SLAPP statute to unambiguously permit such
appeals, and the clear statements in the legislative history confirming the balance the
Legislature intended to strike, Grewal finds the legislative history for this amendment
"not particularly illuminating" and concludes a defendant's right to immediately appeal
orders denying anti-SLAPP motions is insufficiently important to balance out the
prospect that a plaintiff who successfully opposes an anti-SLAPP motion may be forced
to incur fees defending his victory. (See Grewal, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at pp. 10001003.) Grewal therefore calls on the Legislature to eliminate a defendant's right to
appeal from orders denying such motions. (See id. at pp. 1002-1003.)
While it may generally be proper for courts to urge the Legislature to amend a
law, it is improper for Grewal to do so because its call for legislative action is based on
misleading statistics that do not support its claimed abuse of the anti-SLAPP statute
and on an erroneous view of AB 1675's clear legislative history favoring a defendant's
vital right to immediately appeal from orders denying anti-SLAPP motions.
Grewal simply provides no legitimate evidence that the anti-SLAPP statute has
fostered an explosion of abusive motions or appeals. This statute, like any other

Honorable Tani Cantil-Sakauye, Chief Justice
and Associate Justices
March 9, 2011
Page 10
procedural device, can undoubtedly be abused and may thus, on occasion, result in
frivolous anti-SLAPP motions and appeals. (See Varian, supra, 35 Ca1.4th at p. 195.)
But trial and appellate courts are already well-armed to correct these occasional
instances of abuse. (See id. at p. 196.) Grewal's erroneous examples of abuse and
misleading statistics are not a proper basis for urging the Legislature to revisit its prior
determination that the anti-SLAPP statute—including its provision for appellate
review—is vitally necessary to protect constitutional rights from the destructive impact
of SLAPP suits.

Conclusion
For all of the foregoing reasons, this court should order the Court of Appeal's
opinion in Grewal not to be published in the official reports.
Respectfully submitted,

HORVITZ & LEVY LLP
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